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There is little direct evidence about the nature and extent of hiring
discrimination in the United States.2 Indeed, "little is known about how often
minority job applicants are treated less favorably than equally qualified
majority job applicants."3 Yet, both judges and administrators believe our
nation has made great progress in combatting discrimination and that we are
"well along the way to becoming a color-blind society."4 According to Justice
Blackmun, his colleagues too readily endorse that view. Indeed, Justice
1712 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir. 1983).
2 Margery A. Turner et al., Opportunities Denied, Opportunities Diminished;
Discrimination in Hiring, URBAN INSTITUTE REPORT 91-9 (1991).
3 1d. at 5.
41d. at 6.
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Blackmun expressed frustration in his dissent in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio5, stating, "[o]ne wonders whether the majority still believes that race
discrimination-or, more accurately, race discrimination against
non-whites-is a problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was."6
Yet, there is no empirical evidence that discrimination has been eliminated; and
even across the political spectrum there is recognition that the problem still
persists. 7
Although there has been extensive investigation done on black and white
wage differentials, there has been little empirical investigation of
discrimination at the hiring stage.8 Clearly, little progress has been made in
reducing the gap in minority labor force participation.9 Thus, it seems that
"discrimination at the hiring stage may well represent the more pressing issue
in employment today."10
However, as many more claims pertaining to promotions and terminations
are filed, there is a misperception that these reflect a more serious problem than
that of hiring discrimination. 11 But, it may be that the lack of hiring claims is
explained by the heightened difficulty of detecting and proving such claims.
Indeed, "[c]ontact between the applicant and the employer during the hiring
process is typically fleeting, the eventual outcome is unknown to the candidate,
and the process itself rarely signals exclusionary intent."12 Accordingly, victims
of hiring discrimination are less likely to know that they have been
discriminated against, and to have access to information needed to prove it.13
Thus, as discrimination at the hiring stage is subtle and less detectable, it
requires more sophisticated tools of detection-such as the use of testers. The
hiring audit (testing) methodology is an effective means for detecting
concealed discriminatory practices.
Systematic employment testing involves the use of professional social
science methodology, patterned after the methodology accepted in the testing
5490 U.S. 642 (1989). The Supreme Court's decision heightened the plaintiff's
burden in establishing a prima facie case in disparate impact cases, and reduced the
employer's burden in rebutting the plaintiff's prima facie case.
61d. at 662.




11Michael Fix & Raymond Struyk, An Overview of Auditing For Discrimination, in
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 1, 14
(Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds. 1993).
12 1d. at 23-24.
13See Fowler v. McCrory Corp., 727 F. Supp. 228, 233 n.6 (D.Md. 1989) (stating that
victims of hiring discrimination "would not even have known of the employment




of compliance with fair housing laws.14 In a hiring audit, a minority group
tester and a majority group tester are matched on all relevant characteristics. 15
This might include like attributes such as age, physical size, education, work
experience, and demeanor.16 Although some of these characteristics can be
easily assigned for purposes of a hiring audit (i.e. education and prior work
experience), "matching others requires very careful assessment and pairing of
individual [auditor] candidates."17
Indeed, testers go through a comprehensive training program where they
learn techniques for observing their experiences, as well as the proper method
for reporting facts concerning audits. Moreover, the testers engage in and
observe simulated initial employment interviews to observe their partner's
interviewing style, so that the tester pairs will interview similarly in the actual
audit. Throughout the training process, professional testing staff emphasize
the importance of accurate, objective, and detailed reporting of the test results.
Once the testers have been appropriately matched, the testers separately
attempt to inquire about a targeted position, complete an application, obtain
an interview, and seek to be offered the job.18 Differential treatment is
determined by comparing the experiences and results of the two testers. 19 An
employer acts in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 198120 where the black tester has been
deprived generally of the same rights to make and enforce contracts as the
white tester. This note addresses the issue of whether testers have standing to
challenge these racially discriminatory hiring practices under 42 § U.S.C.
1981.21




181d. See generally Roderic V.0. Boggs et al., Use of Testing in Civil Rights Enforcement,
in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 345
(Michael Fix & Raymond Struyk eds., 1993).
19Turner, supra note 2, at 11.
2 0Section 1981 provides that:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as
is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1982).
2 1The author considers tester standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Title VIH of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 2000(e) et seq., appears to provide an alternative basis for standing.
See infra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
19931
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First, the author considers the general requirements for standing. Second,
the issue of whether courts should allow standing for employment testers
under § 1981, and the challenges to such an approach is addressed. Third, the
author considers whether organizations aimed at eliminating discrimination
in employment should have standing to bring suit, in their own right and on
behalf of their members, under § 1981. Finally, recent legislation and federal
agency policy in support of testers is discussed.
II. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR STANDING
Article Ill of the U.S. Constitution 22 limits the federal courts to the resolution
of "'cases' and 'controversies'."23 At a minimum, to satisfy this "case" or
"controversy" requirement, the party bringing the lawsuit must allege "that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,"24 that the injury "fairly can be
traced to the challenged action" and that the injury "is likely to be redressed by
a favorable decision."25
In addition to the constitutional limitations on standing imposed by Article
I1, the federal judiciary has developed a set of prudential considerations in
resolving standing questions.26 First, a plaintiff must generally assert his own
legal rights and interests. Ordinarily, he cannot merely invoke a third party's
rights.27 Moreover, even where a plaintiff has alleged an injury sufficient to
meet the requirements of Article III, the courts have "refrained from
adjudicating 'abstract questions of wide public significance' which amount to
'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared and most appropriately
addressed in the representative branches."28 Finally, the courts have held that
22 Article HI, Section 2 provides in pertinent part:
[1] The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;
... -to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;
-to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State
and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;
... and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens, or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
23 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982).
241d. at 472 (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).
251d. at 472 (quoting Simon v. Eastem Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41
(1976)).
261d. at 474.
27 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see also Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100 (1979).
28Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and




the plaintiff's complaint must "fall within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."29
However, the satisfaction of these prudential considerations alone cannot
substitute for the Article III requirement of "distinct and palpable injury."30 The
standing doctrine thus "prevents the courts from interfering in questions that
'[o]ur system of government leaves... to the political processes."' 31 It is only
after a litigant satisfies these dual requirements that the federal courts will
consider the merits of a dispute.32
III. TESTER STANDING IN THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CONTEXT UNDER
42 U.S.C. § 1981
Twelve years ago, in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,33 the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the standing of testers to challenge discriminatory housing practices
under the Fair Housing Act. Moreover, since that time, lower courts have
endorsed the standing of testers in challenging discriminatory housing
practices under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and § 1982,34 as well. In upholding tester
standing, the courts, including the Supreme Court, have recognized that testing
is an invaluable tool for combatting racial discrimination.35 As with any
29454 U.S. at 475 (quoting Association of Data Processing Services Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)); see also Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,
100, n.6 (1979); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39, n.19 (1976).
30Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; see also Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 798
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (recognizing that litigants must satisfy constitutional requirements for
standing before the court considers prudential standing requirements).
31Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24,30 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
980 (1990), and cert. denied sub nom. Gerstin v. Spann, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991) (quoting
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974)) (alteration
and omission in Spann.)
32"In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the
court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. This inquiry involves both
constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its
exercise." Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
33455 U.S. 363 (1982).
34Section 1982 provides in pertinent part: "All citizens of the United States shall have
the same right ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).
35 See, e.g., Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied
en banc, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 3372 (7th Cir. 1990) (recognizing tester standing under
the Fair Housing Act); Watts v. Boyd Properties, Inc., 758 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985)
(recognizing tester standing under § 1982); Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home
Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977) (recognizing tester standing under § 1981);
Village of Bellwood v. Gorey & Assocs., 664 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. 111. 1987) (recognizing
tester standing under § 1982); Coel v. Rose Tree Manor Apartments, Inc., No. 84-1521,
1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9212 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1987) (recognizing tester standing under
§ 1981); Biggus v. Southmark Mgmt. Corp., No. 83-C-4024,1985 WL 1751 (N.D. Ill. June
13, 1985) (recognizing tester standing under § 1981); Sherman Park Community Ass'n
19931
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standing challenge, the courts must determine whether "the [employment
testers have] alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."36
For testers, the first constitutional requirement of an injury-in-fact will likely
be the most difficult to satisfy. However, because 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides in
pertinent part that "laIll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right... to make and enforce contracts," 37 where a tester
is denied his right to "the initial formation of [a] contract", that denial gives rise
to an injury sufficient to confer standing under § 1981.38 Indeed, the broad
statutory language encompasses the widest possible range of plaintiffs who are
victimized by discrimination in contracting.
Moreover, the fact that the tester's purpose is to test an employer's
practices-rather than to seek actual employment-does not lessen his injury.
Indeed, Article III imposes no requirement that an employment inquirybebona
fide.39 Accordingly, unless a particular statute imposes such a requirement, it
is irrelevant to the question of standing. Section 1981 imposes no such
mandate.40 Instead, to achieve its objectives, it reaches preliminary inquiries
which serve as the basis for any ultimate agreement.
In addition, testers often suffer emotional injuries such as humiliation and
embarrassment as a result of an employer's discriminatory hiring practices.
These injuries, too, are sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.41 The
v. Wauwatosa Realty Co., 486 F. Supp. 838 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (recognizing tester standing
under § 1981).
36Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
3742 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) (emphasis added).
38patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1989).
39E.g., U.S. CONsT., art. I1m, § 2.
40E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
41 As the court noted in McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), affd, 427
U.S. 160 (1976):
Section 1981 doubtless was intended to give to the former slaves access
to opportunities for material betterment of themselves, but it was also
intended to remove the stigma which accompanied the disabilities under
which they formerly had labored. The plain command of the statutes is
that those formerly enslaved henceforth shall be treated as having all of
the rights and dignity of other people dwelling with them in a land of
freedom. A denial of those statutory rights is treatment of the victim as
being subject to those earlier disabilities. It is an affront, of which embar-
rassment and humiliation are natural consequences. If the statute is to be
enforced fairly, if injuries suffered directly because of its violation are to
be fairly compensated, damages for embarrassment and humiliation must
be recoverable. ...
Id. at 1089; see, e.g., Carterv. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225,1238 (D.C. Cir. 1984)




Supreme Court has consistently held that injuries suffered by testers are real
and sufficient to confer standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.42
Beyond the constitutional requirements, the courts must determine whether
prudential considerations bar the finding of standing for tester-plaintiffs in the
employment context under § 1981.43 These prudential limitations ask whether
the tester plaintiff is "assert[ing] his own legal rights and interests; 44 whether
the injury claimed is a "generalized grievance"45 shared by many people; and
finally, whether § 1981 seeks to protect the plaintiff from this sort of injury.46
Once an employer has rejected a person from a job because of race, that person,
when challenging the employer's discriminatory hiring practices, would be
invoking his or her own rights to be protected from invidious discrimination.
Accordingly, the fact that others may share the same concern does not lessen
the tester's individual harm.
Further, the protection from discriminatory hiring practices on the basis of
race, even for tester-plaintiffs, falls within the zone of interest of § 1981.47
Indeed, as the district court recognized in Fowler v. McCrory Corp.,48
By its terms § 1981 protects the exercise of four different rights or sets
of rights: (1) the right to 'make contracts'; (2) the right to 'enforce
contracts'; (3) the related rights 'to sue, be parties, give evidence'; and
Gomezv. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of SanJose, 698F.2d 1019,1021 (9th Cir. 1983) (recognizing
an injury-in-fact where plaintiff suffered 'humiliation and embarrassment" as a result
of defendant's failure to offer him a contract because of his national origin);seealso Davis
v. Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (finding that testers had standing where
humiliation and emotional distress were caused by discriminatory rental policy).
42 See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,373-75 (1982) (concluding
that the injury suffered by tester held sufficient to confer standing under the Fair
Housing Act); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (reasoning that where injury was
sustained by plaintiff, that injury sufficed to confer standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
where plaintiffs entered a Jackson, Mississippi bus terminal for the sole purpose of
testing their rights to desegregated public accommodation, knowing an arrest would
follow); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958) (concluding that the injury suffered by black
tester who chose to sit in the white section of a bus merely to test the legality of
segregation policy held sufficient to allow standing).
4 3See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982).
44 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
4 5Id.
46 See Coel v. Rose Tree Manor Apartments, Inc., No. 84-1521, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9212 at *16 (E.D. Pa. Oct13,1987); Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n,
559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977); see generally Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75.
47 See Fowler v. McCrory Corp., 727 F. Supp. 228, 230 (D.Md. 1989) (stating that
"claims for racial discrimination in hiring and promotion are cognizable under § 1981").
481d.
1993]
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(4) the right to 'the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property."
49
Accordingly, although the use of testers in the employment context to challenge
discriminatory hiring practices is new and unsettled, tester-plaintiffs would
likely satisfy the constitutional and prudential requirements of standing.
In the employment setting, only a few courts have discussed a plaintiff's
status as a tester, and none have expressly rejected the standing of such
individuals to bring suit on their own behalf. In Lea v. Cone Mills Corp.,S0 the
district court enjoined the defendant's discriminatory hiring practices under
Title VII, but refused to award back pay or attorneys' fees to the tester-plaintiffs.
The court advanced three reasons for limiting the award of damages: (1) it was
"clearly apparent" that the plaintiffs' "primary motive was to test defendant's
employment practices rather than to seek actual employment;" (2) the
defendant had not since employed any females with plaintiffs' credentials; and
(3) no vacancy existed at the time plaintiffs sought employment from the
defendant.5 1
However, when the case was appealed to the Fourth Circuit,52 the status of
the plaintiffs as testers received further attention. The Fourth Circuit not only
affirmed the district court's decision, but also vacated the denial of attorneys'
fees.53 The court acknowledged that "specific employment was not sought,"
and that "the application [might] solely [have been] a predicate for th[e] suit."54
The court found this, however, to be irrelevant as to the matter of attorneys'
fees.55 Indeed, the majority concluded that the plaintiffs had prevailed on the
merits by obtaining an injunction against the defendant's discriminatory
employment practices, and, therefore, the "[p]laintiffs should not be denied
attorneys' fees merely because theirs was a 'test case."'%
Judge Boreman angrily dissented from the court's decision to award
attorneys' fees.5 7 He argued that "[tihe allowance of attorney's fees is
specifically left to the discretion of the trial court; [and] there should be no
4 91d. at 231.
50301 F. Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969), affd in part and vacated in part, 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir.
1971).
51438 F.2d at 89-90 (Boreman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Lea
v. Cone Mills Corp., 301 F. Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969), affd in part and vacated in part, 438
F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971).
52See Lea, 438 F.2d 86.
53 Id.
54 1d. at 88.
55Id.
5 61d.





interference... unless there [has been] a clear showing of abuse of such
discretion," which he found lacking in the lower court's decision.5 8 To him, "this
entire case smack[ed] of nothing but manufactured litigation and, to employ a
rather harsh but well known characterization-'ambulance chasing'-with the
plaintiffs themselves serving merely as puppets or as pawns in the game."59
In Lea, the Fourth Circuit did not specifically discuss the issue of tester
standing. Significantly, the standing of the Lea plaintiffs went unquestioned.
Indeed, by awarding injunctive relief and attorneys' fees to tester-plaintiffs, the
Fourth Circuit, at least implicitly, supported the standing of tester-plaintiffs to
challenge discriminatory employment practices under Title VII.60
Since its decision, however, the Lea court's approach to tester-plaintiffs has
been challenged. In Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co.,61 the plaintiffs challenged the
defendant's employment practices both under Title VII and § 1981. Although
the Fourth Circuit decided the case without ultimately deciding the relevance
of the plaintiff's tester status, the holding was accompanied by dicta with
important implications for tester-plaintiffs. 62 Indeed, the dicta suggests that
whether an employment application is bona fide should be a relevant factor in
the legal outcome.63 However, the court does not address what effect the
plaintiff's tester status would have had on its decision, and it is unclear whether
the court would have denied standing to the plaintiff, or as in Lea, only limited
the award of damages (back pay, injunctions, attorneys' fees) available to the
plaintiff.64
Furthermore, in Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y,65 a Georgia
district court relied on Judge Boreman's dissent in Lea66 to restrict a
tester-plaintiff from challenging employment discrimination under Title VII
and § 1981. The districtjudge stated that the plaintiff had the burden of proving
a prima facie case of racial discrimination by satisfying the McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green67 test.
1. that he is a member of a protected class;
2. that he applied for a job...;
3. that he was qualified for the job;
581d.
591d. at 90.
60 Id. at 86-88.




65657 F. Supp. 1022 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
6 6Lea v. Cone Mills, Corp., 438 F.2d 86,88-91 (4th Cir. 1971) (Boreman, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
67411 U.S. 792 (1973).
19931
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4. that, despite his qualifications, he was not hired; [and]
5. that at the time he applied a job was open and defendant
continued to seek application [sic] from persons of plaintiff
Parr's qualifications.6
The court concluded that the tester-plaintiff had failed to make out a prima
facie case. The court emphasized his insincere motive in seeking employment
and stated, "a plaintiff whose primary purpose in interviewing for a job is to
create the basis for a Title VII EEOC charge and lawsuit, is not the bona fide
applicant for a job that he must be to establish a prima facie case [under Title
VII]."69 Although in Parr,70 the tester-plaintiff never submitted an employment
application, the court explained that even if he had, he would still have been
viewed as "nothing more than a test plaintiff," who could not have been injured
by the defendant's refusal to hire him. 71 Accordingly, Parr suggests that
tester-plaintiffs may not be able to establish a prima facie case of employment
discrimination at all.72 However, the effect of this court's decision is limited
because in Parr, unlike most tester cases, the tester did not even complete an
employment application. 73 The application is an important step in beginning
the inquiry that § 1981 recognizes as a necessary foundation of any later
contract. Furthermore, in holding against tester-plaintiffs, the Parr74 court
relied only on dicta in Sledge,75 and on Judge Boreman's dissent in Lea,76 which
challenged the majority's award of attorneys' fees.77
Although these cases have not expressly addressed the issue of tester
standing, they have suggested that because of insincere motives,
tester-plaintiffs suffer no personal injury when rejected from a job, and thus,
would not meet the constitutional requirements of standing. Outside the
employment context, however, case law clearly supports the standing of testers
to challenge discriminatory practices, absent even a bona fide application.
Indeed, the federal courts have repeatedly held that testers have standing to
68 Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 657 F. Supp. 1022, 1032 (M.D. Ga.
1987).
691d. The court did not expressly analyze the plaintiff's § 1981 claim, but it entered
judgment for the defendant "as to his claims under Title VII and §'1981." Id. at 1033.





75 Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981
(1979).
76 Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1971)(Boreman, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).




bring suit for discriminatory housing practices under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. For
example, in Coel v. Rose Tree Manor Apartments, Inc.,78 the Pennsylvania district
court held that testers "have the same right to truthful information" about the
availability of possible contracts as other individuals, and allowed tester
standing under § 1981.79 Similarly, in Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home
Ownership Ass'n,80 the Third Circuit expressly held that Meyers' status as a
housing tester did not deny him standing under § 1981, even though his
application for housing was intended solely for testing Pennypack's policies.
Likewise, in Sherman Park Community Ass'n v. Wauwatosa Realty Co., 8 1 the
district court, in finding standing for housing testers under § 1981, expressly
held that standing is "available to the full extent permitted by Article III."82
Several courts have also recognized tester standing under § 1982,83 the
housing counterpart to § 1981.84 Indeed, in Watts v. Boyd Properties, Inc.,85 the
Eleventh Circuit held that the housing tester had standing to challenge
discriminatory housing practices under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Furthermore, in
Village of Bellwood v. Gorey & Associates,86 the district court found standing for
the tester-plaintiffs under § 1982. As both § 1981 and § 1982 derive from Section
1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, "[b]oth are subject to the same analysis and
must be interpreted in the same light." 87 Accordingly, the Watts88 and Village
of Bellwood8 9 cases provide additional precedent for the standing of testers
under § 1981.
78 No. 84-1521, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9212 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13,1987).
791d. at *16.
80559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977).
81486 F. Supp. 838 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
821d. at 842.
8342 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).
8442 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
85758 F.2d 1482*(11th Cir. 1985).
86664 F. Supp. 320, 324-26 (N.D. 111. 1987).
87 McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (1975) affd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); see also
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973) (noting the relation
between § 1981 and § 1982, their common derivation from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and the necessity of according them similar interpretation).
88758 F.2d 1482.
89664 F. Supp. 320.
1993]
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One court found standing in the employment context under § 1981, both for
testers and for the organization directing their activities.90 That fresh precedent
now must be considered together with the clear precedent in the
non-employment cases brought under § 1981, § 1982, and the Fair Housing Act
that testers have suffered the requisite injury to confer standing.91 In sum, as
"[t]he very essence of civil liberty... consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury," the courts
should find standing for employment testers under § 1981.92
IV. CHALLENGES TO TESTER STANDING IN THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
CONTEXT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Despite the many benefits of testing as a basis to uncover discriminatory
practices, there have been both legal and policy challenges to the device. The
legal challenges have questioned the standing both of testers and of any
organization that supervises them. Challengers to tester standing argue: (1) that
the testers have suffered no injury because they were aware of the risks of
discrimination; (2) that the testers' intended to decline any offers of
employment, so they are not harmed by a denial; and (3) that the employer
organization overseeing the testing program also suffered no harm.93
As with any standing challenge, the central question is whether the testers
have suffered a judicially cognizable personal injury sufficient to create a "case
or controversy" under Article III of the Constitution.94 Opponents of
employment tester standing under § 1981 argue that testers have suffered no
"distinct or palpable injury."95 First, opponents allege that humiliation or
90Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp.,
829 F. Supp. 402,407 (D.D.C. 1993). The district court also held that testers had standing
to sue under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b). The case involved the use of testers in a
suit against a nationwide employment referral agency.
91 See, e.g., Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied
en banc, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 3372 (7th Cir. 1990) (recognizing standing under the Fair
Housing Act); Watts v. Boyd Properties, Inc., 758 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985) (recognizing
standing under § 1982); Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d
894 (3d Cir. 1977) (recognizing standing under § 1981); Village of Bellwood v. Gorey &
Assocs., 664 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (recognizing standing under § 1982); Coel v.
Rose Tree Manor Apartments, Inc., No. 84-1521,1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9212 (E.D. Pa. Oct
13,1987) (recognizing standing under § 1981); Biggus v. Southmark Mgmt. Corp., No.
83-C-4024,1985 WL 1751 (N.D. Ill. June 13,1985) (recognizing standing under § 1981).
92 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137,163 (1803) (emphasis added).
93 BOGGS, supra note 18, at 364-67.
94See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).





emotional injury, without more, is not sufficient to confer Article III standing.96
Second, opponents contend that any harm suffered by the testers is incurred
voluntarily, and therefore "the testers and not the discriminating employer are
actually the cause of the harm."97 Indeed, in Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi,98 the
court stated, "The standing of... testers is, as an original matter, dubious. They
are investigators; they suffer no harm other than that which they invite in order
to make a case against the persons investigated .... The idea that their legal
rights have been invaded seems an arch-formalism." 99
However, the Supreme Court has ruled otherwise. Beginning with Evers v.
Dwyer,100 the Supreme Court held that a black man who had chosen to sit in
the white section of a bus, solely to test the legality of the segregation policy,
had suffered a harm sufficient to confer standing under the civil rights laws.
Later, in Pierson v. Ray,101 the Supreme Court similarly held that a black man
had been harmed when he entered the segregated section of a bus station with
the intent of testing the lawfulness of the segregation policy. Then, in Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman,102 the Supreme Court again found that black testers,
who had been misinformed when inquiring about the availability of housing,
had suffered the requisite harm to confer standing. Indeed, the point is that
"testers do not surrender their rights to be free from discrimination simply
because they voluntarily approach test sites with the intention of testing for
discrimination."103
Furthermore, those opposing employment tester standing under § 1981
argue that § 1981 protects a narrow right "to make and enforce contracts," in
contrast with the broad statutory rights conferred by the Fair Housing Act.104
Opponents contend that the making of a contract under the common law of
contracts requires an intent to be bound, a bona fide offer and acceptance.105
Testers lacking this intent have not suffered "an actual or threatened injury" in
96 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,176 (1989). But see Carter
v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225,1238 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that "humiliation
is a cognizable and compensable injury under § 1981").
97 BoGcs, supra note 18, at 365.
98895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied en banc, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 3372 (7th
Cir. 1990).
991d. at 1526.
100358 U.S. 202 (1958).
101386 U.S. 547 (1967).
102455 U.S. 363, 373-75 (1982).
103BOCCS, supra note 18, at 365.
104Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176 (1989); see also Gersman v.
Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 931 F.2d 1565,1572 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. granted and judgment
vacated, 112 S.Ct. 960 (1992).
105See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1973).
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an attempt to make a contract, and accordingly do not fall within the zone of
interest protected by § 1981.106 Indeed, in Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc.,107 the
D.C. Circuit held that § 1981 and § 1982 "have a limited province and do not
qualify as all-purpose antidiscrimination or comprehensive open housing
laws."108
Moreover, opponents allege that the Havens10 9 decision, allowing limited
standing under the Fair Housing Act, does not support standing under § 1981.
Havens, of course, is the seminal case in support of tester standing in the
housing context. In Havens, the testers were found to have standing under the
broad provisions of § 804(d) of the Fair Housing Act, as distinguished from
§ 804(a), under which testers would not have had standing because of the
requirement of a bona fide offer.110 Thus, some argue that § 1981 is similar to
§ 804(a), and requires a bona fide offer to contract. 111 Accordingly, those
opposed feel standing should be denied to testers under § 1981.
However, § 1981 was designed to meet chronic race discrimination in
contracting. It should be interpreted liberally to assure that its purposes will be
achieved. The tester and his organization come within the coverage of the
statute even though they do not intend to make a contract. The freedom to
contract, if it is to be meaningful, must include the freedom to engage in
preliminary discussion with no certainty of an ultimate contract.1 1 2 Moreover,
the conditions providing such freedoms must exist and be perceived as existing
10 6See, e.g., Grant v. Smith, 574 F.2d 252, 255 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that good faith in
contracting is necessary under §§ 1981 and 1982, but is not pertinent to the broad
standing allowed by the Fair Housing Act).
107899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 980 (1990), and cert. denied sub nom.
Gerstin v. Spann, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
108Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
109455 U.S. 363 (1982).
11 0Section 804 reads: "[Ilt shall be unlawful-
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or
to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
(4) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin that any dwelling is
not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling
is in fact so available."
42 U.S.C. § 3604; see United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 650 (N.D.
Cal. 1973), affd in part, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975) (concluding that testers would not
qualify for standing under § 804(a) of the Fair Housing Act).
111 See, e.g., Grant v. Smith, 574 F.2d 252, 255 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that "[t]he
plaintiffs' good faith or lack of it would be pertinent to the claims asserted under [§ 1981
and § 1982)").




so that individuals-discouraged by previous patterns of discrimination-will
be encouraged to seek employment.
The tester and his organization seek to engage in an important component
of § 1981, namely the preliminary discussion. Allowing tester standing offers
remedies for employment discrimination not easily attainable otherwise. These
remedies will both deter employer misconduct, and help to achieve the
conditions for an open and non-discriminatory employment environment in
the nation. Precedent also establishes that contract formation is not a matter of
subjective intent, but rather of the objective circumstances. 113 Accordingly,
§ 1981 should be interpreted so as to permit standing to the tester and his
organization.
Finally, those opposing employment tester standing argue that there are
strong prudential reasons for denying standing to testers who fabricate their
credentials, misrepresent their status to prospective employers and then sue
for injuries, especially given the narrow rights protected by § 1981.114 Indeed,
opponents contend that testers are not protecting their individual right to
contract, but are only protecting the broad contract rights of third parties.
Furthermore, opponents argue that "its use of deception renders it offensive to
public policy and even unethical." 115
In particular, opponents analogize testing to entrapment; however, there is
arguably a clear distinction between the two. In entrapment, a crime is induced
by the prosecution's direct involvement in a criminal scheme. 116 Clearly, "[clivil
rights enforcement testing . .. is different from most undercover law
enforcement. In civil rights testing, testers are instructed not to suggest a
discriminatory outcome of their test. When an intent to discriminate is
expressed, it is initiated by the test subject."117 Given this distinction, it is
understandable that the courts have recognized the "strong national policy
favoring vigorous enforcement of our civil rights laws," repeatedly approving
the use of civil rights testing.118 Indeed, in Richardson v. Howard,119 the Seventh
Circuit recognized the crucial role of testers in gathering evidence in
113 d. at §§ 3.6-3.9.
114 In Sherman Park Community Ass'n v. Wauwatosa Realty Co., 486 F. Supp. 838
(E.D. Wis. 1980), the court noted that, because of the broad statutory reading of the
statute, prudential considerations do not apply in housing cases under the Fair Housing
Act. In contrast, in Clifton Terrace Assoc., v. United Technologies Corp., 929 F.2d 714
(D.C. Cir. 1991), the court granted summary judgment on prudential grounds on claims
brought under §§ 1981 and 1982.
115BOGGs, supra note 18, at 366.
116See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,435 (1972); Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. 369 (1958).
117BoGGs, supra note 18, at 366.
118Id. See also supra note 94.
119712 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1983).
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discrimination cases, and convincingly disposed of opponents' arguments
against testing in the housing area. The court stated:
It is frequently difficult to develop proof in discrimination cases and
the evidence provided by testers is frequently valuable, if not
indispensable. It is surely regrettable that testers must mislead
commercial landlords and homeowners as to their real intentions ....
Nonetheless, we have long recognized that this requirement of
deception was a relatively small price to pay to defeat racial
discrimination. The evidence provided by testers both benefits
unbiased landlords by quickly dispelling false claims of discrimination
and is a major resource in society's continuing strugle to eliminate the
subtle but deadly poison of racial discrimination. "
In sum, those challenging the standing of testers under § 1981 contend that
testers cannot meet the Article III requirements for standing, and prudential
considerations weigh strongly against allowing tester standing. However, for
many years, the courts, including the Supreme Court, have approved the use
of civil rights testing in a number of areas. The employment context is an
appropriate one, as well.121
Of course, possible objections to tester standing could be diminished by
using testers who have mixed motives. For example, a person who is sincerely
interested in seeking particular employment clearly has no standing problem
in challenging the discriminatory practices of an employer, even if that person
was also motivated by a desire to test the employer's hiring practices. Indeed,
in Coel v. Rose Tree Manor Apartments, Inc.,122 the plaintiff acted as a tester while
sincerely looking for an apartment. The Coel court stated that because the
plaintiff "was actually an apartment-seeker, as well as a 'tester', her standing
[could not] really be questioned."123 Thus, mixed-motive testers would
alleviate many of the challenges to tester standing. But, even absent such
mixed-motives, standing for the individual tester should be deemed present.
As we have said, the tester, whatever his ultimate goal, is bona fide in the
inquiry stage. He or she seeks to ascertain an employer's policy and practice.
A broad and liberal inquiry stage is fundamental if contract protections are to
be meaningful. As in the housing area, only if individuals are confident that
there is an open and fair inquiry process will the goals of §1981 be met.
120 1d. at 321.
12 1See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.





V. ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING IN THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
CONTEXT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Does a nonprofit organization, organized to eliminate discriminatory
practices in employment, and which implements a program of systematic
employment testing, have standing to sue for violations of § 1981?
An organization can assert standing in two ways: direct standing, and
indirect, or "associational,"124 standing. An organization asserts direct standing
when it sues for an injury to itself.125 On the other hand, an organization asserts
associational standing when it sues on behalf of injuries to its members. 126
Regardless of which theory of standing an organization sues under, the same
constitutional and prudential requirements must be satisfied. 127 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has noted that often precedent can resolve the standing
question.128
A. Direct Standing
"An organization has standing on its own behalf if it meets the same standing
test that applies to individuals. The organization must show actual or
threatened injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the alleged illegal action and
likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision. 129 "But the 'injury-in-fact'
test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the
party seeking review be [it]self among the injured."130 In Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman,13 1 the Supreme Court addressed the question of what kind of
allegations of injury were sufficient for an organization to have standing in its
own right under Article III. In Havens, Housing Opportunities Made Equal
(HOME), a nonprofit organization designed to promote equal opportunities in
124See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)
(noting that associational standing is also known as "representational standing").
125Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (recognizing that an organization is entitled to
sue on its own behalf for harm it is has sustained); see also Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,380, n. 20 (recognizing that an organization may suffer an injury
to its noneconomic interests).
126 See Hunt, 432 U.S. 333 (permitting the Washington State Apple Advertising
Commission to assert representational standing on behalf of the apple growers and
dealers to challenge the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute which only allowed
apples to enter the state bearing federal or state approval).
127 See generally Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation
of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
128 See Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24,29 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 980 (1990), and cert. denied sub nom., Gerstin v. Spann, 998 U.S. 1046 (1991) (quoting
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751-52 (1984)).
129 Spann, 899 F.2d at 27.
130Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972).
131455 U.S. 363 (1982).
1993]
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
housing, sued Havens Realty Corporation for allegedly engaging in "racial
steering" practices, in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.132 HOME
claimed that it had "been frustrated by defendants' racial steering practices in
its efforts to assist equal access to housing through counselling and other
referral services," and that it "had to devote significant resources to identify and
counteract the[se] ... discriminatory steering practices."133 The Supreme Court
found HOME had standing in its own right and held that "[s]uch concrete and
demonstrable injury to the organization's activities-with the consequent
drain on the organization's resources-constitutes far more than simply a
setback to the organizations's abstract social interests." 134
However, as the D.C. Circuit recognized in Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc.,135
"[a]n organization cannot... manufacture the injury necessary to maintain a
suit from its expenditure of resources on that very suit. Were the rule otherwise,
any litigant could create an injury in fact by bringing a case, and Article III
would present no real limitation."136 Hence, as Havens137 makes clear, the
Supreme Court considered the frustration of HOME's purpose, as well as the
resulting drain on its resources, sufficient to meet the Article III requirements
for standing "independent of its suit challenging the action."138 Later, in Spann,
the D.C. Circuit recognized that "expenditures to reach out to potential home
buyers or renters who are steered away from housing opportunities by
discriminatory advertising, or to monitor and to counteract on an ongoing basis
public impressions created by [discriminatory] use of print media, [were]
sufficiently tangible to satisfy Article III's injury-in-fact requirement."139
As discussed, prudential considerations are an additional roadblock to
standing.140 Although "Congress may create a statutory right.., the alleged
deprivation of which can confer standing to sue even where the plaintiff would
have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute,"141
courts generally make prudential inquiries under the Civil Rights Act. 142
1321d. at 366.
133Id. at 379.
1341d.; see also Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739.
135899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 980 (1990), and cert. denied sub nor.
Gerstin v. Spann, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
1361d. at 27.
137455 U.S. 363 (1982).
138 Spann, 899 F.2d at 27; see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379
(1982).
139 Spann, 899 F.2d at 29.
140Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982).





Indeed, "[u]nlike the Fair Housing Act, Sections 1981 and 1982 do not create a
statutory right which confers standing even where plaintiff[s] would otherwise
have no judicially cognizable injury."143
Accordingly, an organization must allege specific, programmatic injuries,
and not merely "generalized grievances."144 "A sincere, vigorous interest in the
action challenged, or in the provisions of law allegedly violated, will not do to
establish standing if the party's interest is purely ideological, uncoupled from
any injury in fact, or tied only to undifferentiated injury common to all
members of the public."145 Indeed, "[tihe federal courts were simply not
constituted as ombudsmen of the general welfare."146 Accordingly, in Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,147
the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff-taxpayer's standing to challenge the
conveyance of property allegedly violating the Establishment Clause. The
Court reasoned that respondents "fail[ed] to identify any personal injury
suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than
the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of
conduct with which one disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer
standing under Article III."148 Indeed, "standing is not measured by the
intensity of the litigant's interest or the fervor of his advocacy."149 Thus, in Sierra
Club v. Morton,150 a membership corporation with a special interest in the
conservation of the national parks was denied standing to challenge the
development of a ski resort in the beautiful Mineral King Valley, as "a mere
'interest in a problem', no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter
how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient
by itself to render the organization... 'aggrieved'."151
However, the fact that an organization has a "special interest" in the
elimination of employment discrimination does not diminish the organiza-
143 Saunders v. General Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042,1054 (E.D. Va. 1987).
144Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500); see also Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,739 (1972)(stating that "[a] mere 'interest in a problem,' no matter
how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in
evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization 'adversely
affected' or 'aggrieved'.... ").
145Capital Legal Found. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 711 F.2d 253, 258 (D.C. 1983);
see also Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727.
146Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 487.
147454 U.S. 464.
1481d. at 485 (emphasis in original).
1491d. at 486.
150405 U.S. 727 (1972).
151Id. at 739.
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tion's specific harm to its programs. 152 Prudential limitations, of course, require
that the organization assert its own interests, and not merely the "putative
rights of third parties."153 Accordingly, in Saunders v. General Services
Corporation,154 the court held that although the nonprofit fair housing
corporation had standing to sue the operator of an apartment complex and its
president for violations of the Fair Housing Act, "prudential limitations ...
militate against according [the organization] individual standing under
Sections 1981 and 1982,"155 because the organization did not allege any
individualized harm.156 In making such a determination, courts consider twa
factors: "the concreteness of the claimed injury[,] and the degree to which the
policies underlying the statute allegedly violated by the defendant can be
vindicated by granting... third-party standing."157 Indeed, in Barrows v.
Jackson,158 the U.S. Supreme Court, in finding third party standing, reasoned
that the defendant was the perfect adversary since "it would be difficult if not
impossible for the persons whose rights are asserted to present their grievance
before any court."159 Hence, where an organization's injuries are caused as:a
result of its efforts to defend persons protected under § 1981 from invidious
discrimination, courts have repeatedly found no prudential reasons for
denying third party standing under § 1981.160
Finally, prudential limitations require the specific harm to the organization
to come "within 'the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
152 See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
1 53 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975).
154659 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Va. 1987).
155Id. at 1054.
156 The Supreme Court has found third party standing in some cases. See Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (concluding that vendor had standing to challenge statute
imposing penalties on males under 21 years and females under 18 years by asserting
males' equal protection rights); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (concluding that
physicians had standing to challenge statute imposing penalties on physicians for
performing certain abortions by asserting patient's privacy rights).
157Fowler v. McCrory Corp., 727 F. Supp 228, 233 (D. Md. 1989).
158346 U.S. 249 (1953).
159Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water Dist., 601 F.2d 9,14 (1st Cir. 1979)(quoting Barrows
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953)).
160See, e.g., Des Vergnes 601 F.2d at 13-15; Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black
Jack, 467 F.2d 1208,1212-13 (8th Cir. 1972); accord DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511
F.2d 306,311-12 (2d Cir. 1975), reh'g, 520 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1975) (recognizing thata white
person injured while protecting the rights of minorities has third party standing under
§ 1981); Fowler v. McCrory Corp., 727 F. Supp. 228,232-33 (D. Md. 1989) (recognizing
that a white employee fired for opposing employer's hiring discrimination had third




or constitutional guarantee in question."1 61 In making such a determination,
courts have looked to the words of the statute, and its legislative history.162 The
zone of interest test "is passed if a plaintiff's interest in the agency action
appears to fall within the ambit of the constitutional dause, statute, or
regulation allegedly violated."163 Indeed, as the court noted in Capital Legal
Foundation v. Commodity Credit Cop.,164 "[tihe would-be plaintiff's interest in
the relevant law is ascertained by injury in fact; the law's interest in the
would-be plaintiff is determined by the 'zone of interests' test. Mutuality of
interests must be credibly asserted."165 Accordingly, the interest of eliminating
discrimination in employment is clearly within the zone of interests protected
by § 1981. Hence, where an organization seeks redress for its own injuries
suffered as a result of an employer's discriminatory practices, and wishes to
vindicate the rights of those actual victims of discrimination who are unable to
do so effectively, prudential considerations weigh in favor of finding standing
under § 1981.
B. Representational Standing
An association has representational standing if "(a) its members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to
protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit. 166 Accordingly, if an organization can prove that any
of its members were injured, or injury was threatened as a result of
discriminatory hiring practices, the organization will be successful in meeting
the first requirement. Moreover, an organization, whose purpose is ensuring
equal employment opportunity, will clearly meet the second requirement by
seeking to protect an employee's interest in nondiscriminatory hiring practices.
Furthermore, the third requirement will be satisfied where the suit "raises a
pure question of law," and it becomes unnecessary for the court to consider the
individual circumstances concerning a particular member's injuries.167 Thus,
where an organization successfully satisfies all three requirements, there is
161 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464,475 (1982) (quoting Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).
162 Control Data Corp. v. Baldridge, 655 F.2d 283,294 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 881 (1981).




166Saunders v. General Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042,1052 (E.D. Va. 1986) (quoting
Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
167Id. at 1052 (quoting International Union, UAW v. Brock, 477, U.S. 274,274 (1986)).
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adequate proof to confer standing upon the organization as a representative of
its members.
VI. PROTECTIVE LEGISLATION
The tester approach, notwithstanding its deception, is a reasonable and
necessary one in ridding society of discrimination. Such a position is reflected
in recent efforts to assure that possible barriers to its use are eliminated. Thus,
a bill passed by the Ohio House of Representatives would exclude the use of
testers from categories of deception prosecutable or prohibited as fraud.168
The bill,169 approved February 12, 1992, by the Ohio House of
Representatives, "appl[ies] to individuals acting on behalf of public or private
groups that investigate discriminatory housing, employment and credit
practices."170 Under existing law:
the offense of falsification occurs if a person knowingly makes a false
statement... when the statement is in writing and is made for certain
purposes. This offense is a first degree misdemeanor. Under the bill, if
a person was charged with falsification (as described above) as a result
16 8See Am. H.B. 455 119th General Assembly Regular Sess. (1991-92).
169H.B. 455 "would amend section 2921.13 of the Ohio Revised Code to permit persons
investigating discriminatory practices to make false statements in the course of a
discrimination investigation without being guilty of falsification." Id. Section 1 provides
that section 2921.13 of the Revised Code be amended to read as follows:
Section 2921.13 (A) No person shall knowingly make a false statement,
or knowingly swear or affirm the truth of a false statement previously
made, when any of the following applies:
(8) The statement is in writing, and is made with THE purpose to induce
another to extend credit to or employ the offender, or to confer any degree,
diploma, certificate of attainment, award of excellence, or honor on the
offender, or to extend to or bestow upon the offender any other valuable
benefit or distinction, when the person to whom such statement is directed
relies upon it to his detriment.
(B)(2) IT IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEENSE TO A CHARGE UNDER
DIVISION (A)(8) OF THIS SECTION THAT THE PERSON MADE
THE STATEMENTS TO ANY PERSON FOR THE PURPOSE OF
INVESTIGATING POSSIBLE UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATORY
PRACTICES AND MADE THE STATEMENTS IN THE COURSE OF
AN INVESTIGATION OF POSSIBLE UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINA-
TORY PRACTICES CONDUCTED BY A LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY, OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY AUTHORIZED TO
CONDUCT THE INVESTIGATION, OR ANY OTHER PUBLIC OR
PRIVATE AGENCY OR ORGANIZATION THAT, AS A MATTER OF
COURSE CONDUCTS INVESTIGATIONS OF POSSIBLE UNLAW-
FUL DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES.
Id. (new language of section 2921.13 in all caps).





of statements made during an investigation of possible unlawful
discriminatory practices, that person could establish an affirmative
defense. This defense would only apply if the incident involved
possible unlawful discriminatory practices and the statements were
made in the course of an authorized investigation.17'
Accordingly, the bill "protect[s] testers from a charge of falsification, a
misdemeanor, if the untrue statements were made for the purpose of
investigating possible discriminatory practices."172 However, because this is an
affirmative defense "[t]he burden of going forward with the evidence of an
affirmative defense, and the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the
evidence... is upon the accused."173
The Ohio Civil Rights Commission strongly supports the bill. 174 In a letter
to Representative Otto Beattyl 75 the bill's sponsor, Joseph T. Carmichael, the
Executive Director of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, stated:
It is essential for the continued protection of the civil rights of all Ohio
citizens for persons affiliated with civil rights agencies, whether they
be governmental or private, to investigate allegations of
discrimination without fear of being charged with the Ohio laws
governing the making of false statements on sworn documents. The
use of such 'testers' has long been recognized as crucial in the field of
housing discrimination. And now that steps are being taken to
incorporate the use of testers into the employment discrimination
arena, such protection could be more important than ever.
176
Presumably, more such measures will be introduced into the legislatures
throughout the country because of a growing recognition of the importance
and reasonableness of this approach.
171Fiscal Note, H. B. as reported by House Ethics and Standards Committee, January
21,1992.
172Chalfant, supra note 170.
173H. B. 455, 119th General Assembly, Regular Sess. § 2901.05(A), Comment 2
(1991-92).
174 See Letter from Joseph T. Carmichael, Executive Director, Ohio Civil Rights
Commission, to Representative Otto Beatty, Ohio House of Representatives (February
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VII. FEDERAL AGENCY POLICY
In 1990, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued.a
Policy Guidance 177 concerning the use of testers to detect discriminatory hiring
practices. "After examining the principles of standing to sue and the application
of testing in the field of fair housing, the EEOC concluded that testers denied
equal employment opportunities for a reason prohibited by EEO laws have
been harmed and may challenge the discrimination themselves. " 178
Accordingly, the EEOC concluded that "testers who pose as job applicants for
the sole purpose of uncovering illegal discrimination have standing to
challenge these practices under Title VII."179 Indeed, the agency directed its
regional offices to accept discrimination charges filed by testers and by
organizations filing charges on a tester's behalf.180 "This development
constituted the first endorsement by a government agency of the use of EEO
testing as an enforcement technique."'181
As stated in the text of the EEOC policy guide issued November 20, 1990:182
Testers in both the housing and employment areas serve essentially the
same function. It is well established that testers in the housing area
have standing to challenge prohibited discriminatory practices by
landlords/realtors. There is no reason to distinguish between the
standing of testers in the housing area and testers in the employment
context. 83
Accordingly, as the courts have been receptive to tester claims brought in the
fair housing area, there is reason to hope that courts will similarly endorse the
standing of testers in the employment area. Moreover, "[tihe EEOC's
interpretation of EEO laws is entitled to substantial deference by the courts
when they are faced with cases brought by EEO testers."18 4
VIII. CONCLUSION
Employment discrimination persists in America, yet traditional approaches
to demonstrating its existence are costly and difficult. 18 5 Where discrimination
1 77See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Policy Guidance on the Use of
Testers, EEOC COMP. MAN. (BNA) § 405.6899 (November 20, 1990).
178 BOGGS, supra note 18, at 362.
179 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, supra note 177, at § 405.6906.
180Id.
18 1BOGGS, supra note 18, at 362.
182 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, supra note 177.
1831d. at § 405.6906.
184 BOGGs, supra note 18, at 362.




occurs today, it is typically subtle and difficult to detect without the use of
advanced social science methodology employing the use of testers.186 Indeed,
direct evidence of hiring discrimination is rare, and as a result, applicants for
employment who suspect discriminatory hiring practices are not likely to bring
challenges. 187 Moreover, unless the discriminatory treatment is overt,
applicants for employment who have been subject to discriminatory hiring
practices will likely not recognize that the treatment they received was
unlawful. Further, where discrimination is suspected, most applicants lack the
proof necessary to support a claim of discrimination.188 Accordingly, testing
can be an enormous help in investigating and evaluating allegations of
discrimination. 189
The most basic roadblock to equal employment opportunities for minorities
is at the hiring stage.190 Obviously, if a person cannot obtain a position, there
can be no hope for promotion or advancement. Accordingly, testers, who apply
for employment and play much the same role they have played in fair housing
cases, are crucial in detecting discriminatory hiring practices that would
otherwise go undetected. 19 1
Although testers may have no real intent to form a contract, there is inquiry,
a necessary first step to assure an open environment in which meaningful
contract development can take place. Moreover, where opportunities to form
a contract or to obtain employment referrals are denied or lessened due to race,
the tester suffers a real injury. This injury results from not being given the same
right to truthful information about the availability and nature of jobs, as well
as the same right to negotiate for jobs, as the tester's majority counterparts. 192
Only by sending a message to employers that they will be subject to a lawsuit
where they deny access to persons who clearly appear acceptable, will the door
be open to all those who legitimately seek employment.
In a perfect world, no need for these somewhat deceptive practices would
exist. But in balancing the benefits and costs, the interest in using meaningful
tools to fight employment discrimination should take precedence over total
forthrightness in this particular setting. Further, the entrapment analogy
furthered by opponents to the use of testers is erroneous. 193 There is no effort
to entice employer's to discriminate. The process involves a neutral
presentation of candidates. It is the employer's or agency's discriminatory
1 86Id.
1871d. at 359; see generally Turner, supra note 2.





193 Id. at 366.
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practices, not the tester's action, that cause denial of the candidate's
employment. 194
Moreover, in other settings deception has been deemed at times to be
necessary or appropriate. Indeed, the federal government regularly uses
informers to gain information not otherwise accessible. Accordingly, the
government ought to endorse the tester approach as a meaningful way to
reduce employment discrimination, a continuing blight on our nation's
conscience. The EEOC, the key investigative agency in the area, has already
recognized a need for testers. 195 And, in at least one state, there is some
indication that state governments will also endorse the practice.196
Given the substantial societal need to attack employment discrimination,
precedent and good sense call for liberal construction of relevant federal
legislation and liberal application of standing inquiries. There has been ample
reason for the Supreme Court to permit standing for testers and their
organizations in the housing area. There is equal justification for extending
tester standing to the employment setting.
MICHELLE LANDEVER
19 41d.
195See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, supra note 177.
19 6See H. B. 455, 119th General Assembly Regular Sess. (1991-92) (Ohio).
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